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COST OF SALVAGE–
A COMPARATIVE FORM APPROACH
Chung-Sheng Chiu1, Chung-Ping Liu2, Ki-Yin Chang2,
Wen-Jui Tseng3, and Yung-Wei Chen1
Key words: salvage, LOF, No Cure-No pay, SCOPIC.

ABSTRACT
The most important principle of salvage is the “No Cure-No
Pay” basis, if there is no recovery, there is no payment, whatever the expense of the operation. However, this principle has
changed in recent years to reflect the public interest in prevention of damage to the environment (Mudric, 2010). The salvor
can now contract in such a way that he is shielded from loss
when responding to high risk or low value casualties (so called
as “No Cure-Some pay”).
Salvage is a high-profit business and high-risk as well in the
world. The case of the Costa Concordia - by no means one of
the largest cruise ships - has highlighted many things, not least
that, despite technological advances, casualties will continue
to happen and they can happen to mega ships. Different forms
of salvage contract will result in different salvage awards. The
aim of this article is to provide a methodology to measure the
costs of salvage from the perspective of shipowner.

I. INTRODUCTION
Salvage is not only an ancient right but one peculiar to maritime law. Marine Salvage has a long history since three thousand
years ago under the Rhodian maritime code, which was applied
in ancient Greece and the Mediterranean, volunteer salvor was
held entitled to be rewarded for his services. The principle was
adopted in Roman law. The fundamental concept of salvage
law is that the salvor should be encouraged by the prospect of
an appropriate salvage award to intervene in any casualty situation to salve the ship, property and, in particular, to save life and
prevent pollution. The salvor’s right to a reward is based on na-
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tural equity, which allows the salvor to participate in the benefit
conferred to shipowner, the ship itself and the ship’s cargo.
Marine Salvage is the salvage of marine property, in essence,
saving it from certain marine peril and thereby bestowing upon
the owner of a distressed vessel a benefit, that were it not for
the salvor, the ownerʼs property would be lost or significantly
damaged. Marine salvage often arises when a vessel (or any marine property of value) is in distress due to some type of emergency, be it a hurricane that puts all vessels in the area at risk,
or a localized danger, such as the endangered vessel being on
fire or having lost power. No matter what the cause of the danger is, a marine peril must have put the vessel at risk of damage
or of complete loss.
The salvage market is highly competitive, with around 5 to 6
global salvage operators dominating the scene. The International
Salvage Union (ISU) is an association representing the interests
of 60 major salvors worldwide, who conduct over 90% of all
salvage activity. Membership of the ISU is restricted to those
companies with a record of successful salvage and pollution prevention. Members are required to have the high level of expertise expected of the professional salvor.
In addition, Associate Membership of the ISU is open to all
organizations and professionals with an interest in salvage, including P & I Clubs, other insurers, law firms, ports, national response organizations, shipowners and managers, coastal local
authorities, environmental organizations, clean-up specialists and
others. The ISU has 72 Affiliated and Associate Members.
In 1978, the ISU commenced an Annual Statistical Survey.
This data now spans a 37-year period and includes around 6,000
salvage operations (of which 50% carried out under LOF).
The salvage award paid out to the salvor is often very generous
and much more than normal pay for work performed. A salvage
reward is based on the salved values and other criteria such as
the skill and efforts of the salvor. Every year, whilst engaged
on LOF contracts, ISU salvors recover property valued in excess of US$1 billion (US$1.65 billion in 2012).

II. PURE SALVAGE AND CONTRACT SALVAGE
1. Definition and the Essential of Pure Salvage
The 1910 Salvage Convention refers to “assistance and sal-
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vage”. Although the 1910 Salvage Convention does not treat
them differently, it does expressly indicate them as “two kinds
of service” (Huang, 1995). A distinction has long been drawn in
the civil law jurisdictions on the continent of Europe between
“salvage” (broadly limited to services rendered to an abandoned
vessel) and “assistance” (services to a vessel in distress but
which has not been abandoned). English law has never recognized this distinction but seeks simply to reward a salvor depending on the nature of the danger from which the salved property
is salved (Shaw, 1996). The 1978 Amoco Cadiz disaster provided
the impetus for a number of changes in the international law of salvage, which ultimately resulted in the 1989 IMO International
Convention in the International Law of Salvage (Redgwell, 1990).
Article 1 of the International Salvage Convention 1989 provides: “For the purpose of this Convention: (a) Salvage operation means any act or activity undertaken to assist a vessel or any
other property in danger in navigable waters or in any other
waters whatsoever.”
It is clear from the Article that the Convention is concerned
with action undertaken to assist vessels or property. Although
the Convention and the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 also contain some provisions for services which are (actually or potentially) beneficial to human lives or the environment, they are
dependent on action taken to assist maritime property.
What Article 1 does not expressly state is whether, to qualify
as salvage under the Convention, it is sufficient that the relevant
act or activity has the effect of assisting maritime property or
whether that must have been the actor’s intention. In practice,
it is unlikely that the distinction can be or will be made. Furthermore, at common law, the former is sufficient; and this will
probably also be the position under the Convention.
The value of the salved property is also relevant to satisfying
the requirement of success or, under the Convention, a “useful
result”. However, this requirement is a prerequisite of an award
of salvage operation, not of whether there is a salvage operation
in the first place. The distinction between a salvage operation
and useful result is made clear by the Convention’s references
to “salvage operations which have had a useful result” and “if
the salvage operation have had no useful result.” There may
therefore be a salvage operation without a useful result in preserving property. If it were otherwise, there would have been
an unintended limitation on the Convention’s provisions for
special compensation (Rose, 2002).
2. Contract Salvage
A claim for salvage is a claim either for “pure salvage” or
“contract salvage.” In pure salvage (also called “merit salvage”),
there is no contract or preexisting agreement between the owner
of the goods and the salvor. The salvor of property under pure
salvage must bring his claim for salvage in a court which has
jurisdiction or go to arbitration, and this will award salvage based
upon the “merit” of the service and the value of the salvaged
property. For the salvor as maritime businessman, pure salvage
is a treacherous and risky business. Pure salvage leaves too many
difficult questions unanswered: under whose law the matter, if
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it becomes a case will be handled; will there have to be a suit
for the salvage award, or can there be arbitration; etc. As a
result, commercial salvage, salvage services provided by those
who purport to make their living as salvage contractors, is normally performed under contract (Cohen, 1982).
The absence of any element or the existence of contract for
salvage will bar a claim for pure salvage award. Claims for pure
maritime salvage are rare in contemporary times, due to the
likely involvement of commercial parties and their preference
for contract salvage. However, these commercial parties do not
always have the opportunity to contract for salvage, such as in
cases of immediate danger and emergency (Zubic, 2011).
In contract salvage, the owner of the property and salvor enter
into a salvage contract prior to the commencement of salvage
operations and the amount that the salvor is paid is determined
by the contract. Salvor enters into an agreement to use “best endeavors” to salve maritime property. This can be a fixed amount,
based on a “time and materials” basis, or any other terms that
both parties agree to. The contract may also state that payment
is only due if the salvage operation is successful (No Cure-No
Pay basis), or that payment is due even if the operation is not
successful.
The law of salvage rewards volunteers who render valuable
services to recognized subjects of salvage in danger. The nature
of this legal right is neither consent-based, nor contractual in nature, and appears as antithetical to the contract law, being based
on public policy and equitable considerations. Nevertheless, in
modern times contracts control salvage operations with such frequency that contractual salvage has become the norm, usually under a standard form contract known colloquially as the Lloydʼs
Open Form (Lennox-King, 2007).

III. VARIOUS SALVAGE CONTRACT FORMS
1. National Forms
Except the world well-known Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF),
there are also various alternative “national” forms of salvage contract, such as U.S. Form, Japanese Form, Beijing Form, Moscow
Form, Turkish Form and etc., but these contracts are generally
only used by vessels and salvors who are in the waters, or who
are nationals, of the particular countries concerned.
(1) Beijing Form - Approved by China Maritime Arbitration
Commission (CMAC). Named China Maritime Arbitration
Commission Standard Form (CMAC 1994).
(2) French Form - Approved by Chambre Arbitrale Maritime
de Paris. Named as Contrat d’Assistance Maritime - Form
of Maritime Salvage Agreement.
(3) German Form - Approved by German Maritime Arbitration
Association. Named as Conditions of German Court of Maritime Arbitration (Deutsches Seeschiedsgericht), Hamburg.
(4) Japanese Form - Approved by Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc.
Named as The Documentary Committee of The Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc.- Salvage Agreement (JSE 91).
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(5) Moscow Form - Approved by Maritime Arbitration Commission at the Chamber of Commerce, Moscow. Named as
USSR Salvage Contract (MAK form).
(6) Scandinavian Form - Approved by Scandinavian Tugowners Association. Named as Skandinavian Salvage Contract
(1987).
(7) Turkish Form - Approved by Turkish Maritime Organization. Named as Turkish Maritime Organization Salvage and
Assistance Agreement.
(8) U.S. Form - Approved by The Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. Named as U.S. Open Form Salvage Agreement
(MARSALV).
Among the above-mentioned national forms, “No Cure-No
Pay” is the basic principle of the contract and the symbol is printed
on its face, except the CMAC 1994. To modify the Beijing Form
at appropriate timing by making reference to LOF is necessary
for facilitating and ensuring that it continues to play an important role in the maritime salvage community in China (Zhao,
2009). In practice, the MARSALV form is seldom signed until
the salvage operation has been completed successfully, because
it is often not practicable to agree the terms in advance, particularly if the peril faced by the vessel is acute (Davies, 2009).
Unlike the LOF, the JSE 91 rewards salvor on the costs he has incurred instead of the total value of the property he has salved.
2. BIMCO Forms
BIMCO (The Baltic and International Maritime Council) is
the recognized world leader in the production and revision of
standard maritime contracts and clauses. The Documentary work
of BIMCO has been one of the cornerstones of the association
for over 100 years because of its importance in providing a tangible contribution to trade facilitation, harmonization and the
raising of contractual standards within the maritime industry,
consistent with our stated vision and mission.
TOWCON/TOWHIRE 2008 (BIMCO, 2016a)
A typical example would be a vessel which has lost engine
power and is drifting, but there is no imminent danger. The weather may be calm and there is no coastline or reef in the path of
the drifting vessel. Therefor, there is no immediate threat to the
ship or to the environment and there is time to consider what
measures should be used. The only service needed may be a
tow to a harbor with the appropriate repair facilities. In such a
situation the preferred contract is “TOWCON”/”TOWHIRE”
(Arnesen, 2012).
WRECKFIXED/WRECKHIRE 2010 (BIMCO, 2016b)
A typical example would be a vessel which has run aground,
though not very heavily. The grounded ship is situated in sheltered waters so that the risk of further damage being caused by
waves or a shift in the weather or wind direction is very low.
Consequently the risk to the environment is also very low. The
hull is not breached, at least not by other than small holes which
can easily be temporarily patched by the salvor. Refloating of

the vessel may be done by shifting of ballast water and bunkers
between tanks. Alternatively clean ballast water may be discharged into the sea and some cargo or bunkers may be removed
to lighten the vessel before refloating it at high tide. This kind
of situation does not call for desperate or hasty measures and
the preferred contract is “WRECKFIXED”/”WRECKHIRE”
(Arnesen, 2012).
3. ISU Forms
An example of fixed price salvage contract published by the
ISU is the lump sum contract “SALVCON 2005”. This agreement is intended to be used by a salvor working under Lloydʼs
Form, or similar contract, who wishes to engage additional assistance, but on a lump sum, non-award sharing basis, as distinct
from the widely used ISU Award Sharing Sub-Contractors Agreement, or the alternative Daily Hire Sub-Contract Agreement
“SALVHIRE 2005”.
Equally a tug owner who wishes to hire out his tug to a
salvor on a lump sum basis may offer its services on the basis of
SALVCON 2005. The formats of these documents are very similar to the BIMCO Towage Agreements, TOWCON/TOWHIRE
and the BIMCO Wreck Removal Agreements, WRECKCON/
WRECKHIRE.
Strictly speaking, these contract forms fall outside the concern of this article and do not count.
4. Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF)
LOF, however, remains the most commonly used standard
contract form. Since 1978 ISU members have performed around
6,000 salvage operations of which approximately 50% were
carried out under LOF, the “No Cure-No Pay” salvage contract.
The “salved value” of ships, bunkers and cargoes involved in
these operations totaled in excess of US$35 billion. The bottom
left hand corner of every LOF lists dates on which previous
editions of the form have been published. The earliest date is
January 15, 1908, but several forms of salvage agreement acceptable to Lloyd’s had been in existence for many years. The
latest version is LOF 2011 after eleven times of amendment in
one hundred years.
Although the LOF is a contract, salvage services performed
pursuant to the LOF are considered to be pure salvage, not contract salvage, because the LOF provides that the contract salvor
is engaged on a “no cure, no pay” basis, and it leaves the reward
amount open in the event of success.

IV. STATISTICS REVIEW
1. LOF Cases Decline Rapidly but Award is Increasing
The economics of the industry have changed. Improvements
in safety regimes have reduced the number of casualties. There
are fewer cases for salvors and yet society’s expectations about
protection of the environment have increased, shore-based authorities tend to be more heavily involved and it means that modern cases may well be more complicated (ISU, 2012).
Traditional “No Cure-No Pay” salvage of marine in peril is
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Table 1. LOF & SCOPIC Statistics.
Year
New cases
SCOPIC invoked
Salvage Values (US$ million)
Award to Values (%)
2006
80
11
85.8
13.6
2007
107
23
392.7
14.8
2008
83
15
299.4
7.1
2009
122
17
571.1
20.4
2010
111
21
65.9
14.4
2011
106
11
69.3
42.51
2012
122
15
116.6
9.0
2013
61
14
65.3
53.92
2014
37
7
95.8
37.93
2015
50
12
105.0
28.14
Source: Lloyds
1
This figure is affected by several Awards issued in complex, low value cases against unrepresented interests, represented parties having
already settled their proportion of the Salvorsʼ claim.
2-4
Ditto.

Table 2. Environmental Salvage, LOF and Other Salvage Contracts.
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Source: ISU

Cases
244
166
221
188
190
216
185

LOF
56
57
55
52
44
29
25

Towage
n/a
n/a
n/a
32
31
29
40

in slow but steady decline throughout the world (Davies, 2009;
Mudric, 2013). According to Lloyd’s Statistics, there were 255
LOF salvage cases in 1980 but only 80 in 2006 and 37 in 2014.
In the 1990s the average LOF case number was 138.7 per year
and average award was 9.56% of property salved (the highest
was 18.8% in 1999). In the 2000s, the average LOF case number decressed to 102.6 per year but average award was up to
12.99% of property salved (the highest was 20.4% in 2009).
In 2015, there were 50 LOF salvage cases and the average award
was 28.1% of property salved (Lloyd’s, 2016) (See Table 1).
In Norway it has been normal that a salvage reward amounts
to 4-5% of the salved values, while in England a reward of
15-20% of the salved value is not unusual.
It should be noted that approximately 75% of these cases
were settled amicably between the parties without need for recourse to arbitration and that therefore the “Award” data shown
reflected only those cases that did proceed to arbitration and in
which an Award was issued (Lloyd’s, 2013).
According to ISU 2015 Statistics, revenue from Lloyd’s Open
Form (LOF) cases at US$ 83 million was the lowest in more than
a decade. 2014 saw the lowest annual number of LOF cases on
record (37) and this may be reflected in the 2015 ISU statistics.
At the same time, revenue from operations conducted under con-

Wreck
11
9
17
42
31
61
21

JSE
39
n/a
n/a
31
54
19
10

Other /Fixed price
138
100
149
31
30
78
89

tracts other than LOF was the second highest at US$ 98 million
and showed a gently rising trend. Revenue from LOF cases has
fallen to below 50% of the total of all “dry” salvage revenue
for the first time - 46% in 2015 (55% in 2014). Similarly, the
number of LOF cases as a percentage of all “dry” salvage cases
was the lowest at 16% in 2015 (23% in 2014) (ISU, 2016). It
also reflected the increasing trend to use other commercial contracts and terms in place of LOF (See Table 2).
An Easy Example:
A 10,000 TEUs container ship is insured for US$ 100 million.
Regardless of her cargo value and deduct 30% damage to the
vessel, 10% salvage award is US$ 7 million. It is an incredible
figure to the highest profit business in the world. LOF seems
like an “open cheque” for the salvor and the decline in LOF
cases is just a matter of time.
According to IUMI 2015 Report, claim frequency is down
after peak in 2008 and is long-term positive to stable trend.
This trend basically matches with the LOF’s decline.
2. Environmental Salvage (So-Called Liability Salvage) is
Increasing
The 1989 Salvage convention extends “a guaranteed reim-
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bursement of the expenses” to salvage services rendered to all
vessels which threaten damage to the environment. A person
rendering salvage services to such a vessel can be sure of recovering his expenses, and if his services actually prevent or
minimize damage to the environment, special compensation representing his expenses plus a “mark-up” of up to 100% (Shaw,
1992).
It would be salutary for courts and arbitrators undertaking
that task to bear in mind the new focus which the 1989 Convention has brought to bear on the protection of the environment. In particular, effect should be given as far as possible to
the new policy, which is directed to encouraging salvage companies and State authorities to establish and maintain the resources needed to avert or minimise the ecological damage
which a significant maritime misadventure can present. It is also
concerned to provide an incentive for the speedy deployment
of those resources without first conducting a detailed cost-benefit
analysis by reference solely to the prospects of recovering a traditional salvage reward (Ryan, 2009).
Professional salvors have begun to focus on pollution prevention, which forms an increasingly large proportion of their work.
That trend is already far advanced in the United States, where the
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) plays the principal role in handling
vessel casualties that involve actual or threatened pollution,
with professional salvors often relegated to a consulting position
with no direct input decision making (Davies, 2009).
The ISU’s Pollution Prevention Survey began in 1994. In the
19 years to end-2013, ISU members have salved 18,575,702
tonnes of potential pollutants, an average of just under one million tonnes per year. This consists of 13,142,007 tonnes of oil
cargoes; 1,307,706 tonnes of chemicals; 1,616,101 tonnes of
bunker fuel and 2,818,565 tonnes of “other pollutants”.
3. P & I Club is Involved and No More “Escape”
Against the background of the problems with special compensation in the Salvage Convention 1989, discussions took
place between the ISU, the International Group of P & I Clubs
and representatives of hull and cargo insurers with a view to
devising an acceptable substitute for the special compensation
provisions of the 1989 Convention. The essential aims were to
define with greater certainty the circumstances in which salvor
would receive remuneration on terms other than “No Cure-No
Pay” and to simplify its assessment, whilst improving the arrangements for provision of security as well as consultation among
the parties. The product of these discussions was SCOPIC.
SCOPIC is an acronym for “special compensation protection
and indemnity clause”. It is important, however, to have well
in mind that the “special compensation” referred to has nothing
to do with special compensation under Article 14 of the Salvage
Convention 1989. It is an adjunct or supplement to LOF. SCOPIC
clauses came into force formally in August 1999. They are now
considered in outline together with the involvement of the insurance industry (Brice, 2000).
SCOPIC operates by guaranteeing the salvor a tariff rate in its
Appendix A together with a guaranteed 25% standard bonus:

this bonus in certain circumstances provided in SCOPIC subject to modification. Since 1999 version, there are 2000, 2005,
2007, 2011,2014 and 2017 versions to reflect inflation. Since its
introduction, SCOPIC has become an important part of the salvage landscape. It has become the preferred choice for many
salvors in dealing with casualties where the prospects of a substantial traditional salvage award may seem slim (Kallimasiotis,
2009).
Whilst the salvage operation is in a critical situation with high
possibility to fail, salvor is no longer afraid of receiving nothing
for his efforts. SCOPIC guarantees “NO Cure-Some Pay” from
the P & I Club or Liability Insurers and the rates are profitable.
One of the most important objectives of the LOF contract is that
it is considered to be likely fair to salvors, property owners and
underwriters. However, there are practical problems that cause
certain disadvantages when applying the SCOPIC clause. If
the salvage was successful and the salved fund was large, salvors may have made more money on a straight LOF claim without SCOPIC, because of the 25% discount if the fund is large
enough (Pardo, 2013). Even so, the ISU is not satisfied for the
award and considers various proposals for possible reform of
the law and practice of salvage. Among these is a proposal, sponsored by the ISU, for the provision of further remuneration to
salvors through the creation of a new “environmental salvage”
award (Rue and Anderson, 2012).
From the point of view of Hull Insurers, discussions on a possible amendment of the Salvage Convention to allow the introduction of a new environmental salvage award continues through
IUMI’s new Salvage Forum. The Nordic Association of Marine
Insurers (Cefor) is of the opinion that marine insurers are better off keeping the existing and well-functioning salvage award
system, work out as a compromise between all the various interests. The unbalance of this system may cause disputes and
delay salvage operations and settlements, and is for these reasons not recommended by the Association (Cefor, 2012).
There were 14 SCOPIC cases invoked in LOF in 1999 and the
number has been increasing steadily. In the 2000s, the average
case number was 16.7 per year. In 2015, there were 12 cases
(See Table 1).

V. PRE-ENGAGED SALVAGE CONTRACT
UNDER AUTHORITY’S CONTROL
1. U.S. Salvage and Marine Firefighting-SMFF
Cohen’s studies suggested that USCG is taking a more central role in the salvage industry (Cohen, 1982). To some extent,
the changing role of professional salvor reflects an increase in
the involvement of government bodies in salvage operations,
particularly in cases where there is a threat of environmental pollution. Since February 22, 2011, all oil tankers and tank barges
operating in U.S. waters must list in their USCG approved Vessel
Response Plans (VRP) a Salvage and Firefighting (SMFF) contractor capable of meeting the regulatory requirements. Contract
for SMFF services must include a funding agreement which is
a mechanism to ensure that there is no delay in response due to
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contract negotiations. According to The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA-90) Regulations (Part 33 CFR 155, et. seq), non-tank
vessel owners are required to submit Vessel Response Plans
(VRPs) to the USCG by 30th January 2014. For the purposes of
these plans, non-tank owners are required to pre-contract with
Qualified Individuals (QIs), Oil Spill Response Companies
(OSROs), Dispersant service providers and salvors. Non-tank
vessel owners with a fuel and cargo capacity of 2,500 barrels or
greater to carry oil (as defined) are required to enter into Funding Agreements with salvors and marine fire-fighting resources.
The requirements for this category of vessels are almost identical to those for tank vessels.
Only five salvors are qualified for the USCG’s requirements and they are T&T Salvage LLC, Resolve Salvage & Fire
(Americas), Inc, Donjon-SMIT LLC, SVITZER Salvage and Marine Response Alliance LLC. However, there are approximately
15,000 non-tank vessels subject to the new requirements which
will undoubtedly present an administrative challenge to vessel
operators, USCG and resource providers alike.
Basically, there are three categories among the above five salvors’ SMFF Funding Agreements - LOF (with the SCOPIC clause
incorporated), BIMCO TOWHIRE and BIMCO WRECKHIRE
with reference to the SCOPIC rates plus a 15%-50% uplift.

Sharing the similar concept with the USCG’s SMFF, Ministry
of Transport of the People’s Republic of China set up administrative provisions on Marine Pollution Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response. It has been put into force since
January 1, 2012. According to the provisions, ship owners/
operators of (a) any ship carrying polluting and hazardous
cargoes in bulk or (b) any other vessel above 10,000 gross tonnage should enter into a pollution cleanup contract with a Maritime
Safety Agency (MSA) approved pollution response company
before the vessel enters a PRC port. Approved clean up contractors will be categorized by the MSA in accordance with their
qualifications and response capabilities and will be assigned
level 1, 2, 3 or 4 status. Ship owners/operators will need to contract with an approved clean up contractor in accordance with
the size and type of vessel.
The pollution cleanup contract only deals with pollution issue.
When a vessel is in a peril and needs salvage services, the provision is silent. In practice, China port authority will not allow
any foreign salvor to perform salvage operation. Hence, local
salvage company is the only choice. LOF, TOWHIRE and
WRECKHIRE may be acceptable in some circumstance depending on shipowner and Hull underwriter’s attitude.

Take Donjon-SMIT LLC for example:
For Category 1 situations. On the basis of a TOWHIRE 2008
in the format as attached to this agreement in Annex 1, suitablyamended. Personnel and equipment rates will be charged at the
rates shown in Annex 5 ‘Rate Sheet’ plus a 20% uplift. Reimbursement of all out of pocket expenses will be on a cost-plus15% basis only and not subject to this 20% uplift.

VI. MEASURING THE COSTS OF SALVAGE
(SALVAGE AWARD)

For Category 2 situations. On the basis of the WRECKHIRE
contract at the Tariff rates in the format as attached to this agreement in Annex 2, suitably-amended, Personnel and equipment
rates will be charged at the rates shown in Annex 5 ‘Rate Sheet’
plus a 50% uplift. Reimbursement of all out of pocket expenses
will be on a cost-plus-15% basis only and not subject to this
50% uplift.
For Category 3 situations. On the basis of an LOF 2011, with
the SCOPIC clause incorporated, in the format as attached to
this Agreement in Annex 3 without amendment.
However, T & T Salvage LLC “abandoned” LOF and applies only daily hire basis on TOWHIRE or WRECKHIRE whatever shipowners choose. With no doubt, T & T wins the majority
of SMFF contracts. Its market share in tanker is over 40% and
the total market share is over 25%. Why? Because it can read
Shipowner’s mind that LOF is the most reluctant contract to
choose from.
2. Regulation of People’s Republic of China on Marine
Pollution Emergency Preparedness and Emergency
Response (Document No: MOC 2011.4)

When a salvage service is rendered voluntarily in the absence
of a contract, the court determines the salvage award according to six factors enumerated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
The Blackwall case. The law, however, does not specify a precise formula or rule for calculating awards on the basis of the
Blackwall factors:
(1) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage
service;
(2) The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering
The service and saving the property;
(3) The value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service and the degree of danger to which such
property was exposed;
(4) The risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from
the impending peril;
(5) The value of the saved property; and
(6) The degree of danger from which the property was rescued.
Each factor, however, is not given equal weight. Furthermore,
several courts have reversed the order of these factors so that
greater weight is given to the value of the salved property, which
includes both ship and cargo, and the degree of danger in a given
situation, thus permitting a more realistic appraisal of the respective costs and benefits to the parties (Force, 2004). Markovits
(2008) opines that some law and economics scholars seem to assume that - if the courts make the marine-salvage awards that are
the most-allocatively-efficient awards they could make - marineperil-related misallocation will be eliminated. As the proceed-
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ing discussion implies, this optimistic conclusion is unwarranted.
In addition to above, it has also been said that the amount of
salvage reward is dependent upon the discretion of the court/
arbitrator or “what Lord Stowell used to call it, a rusticum
judicium”, but this is misleading. Obviously the tribunal must
make a decision in the particular circumstances before it. It
should take account of those factors which have been recognized
as relevant to the assessment of salvage rewards, evaluating them
in the light of the particular factors and also of its professional
experience of the prevailing practice of assessing salvage rewards (Rose, 2002).
Teitelbaum (2013) used two statistical methods - fractional
polynomial regression and regression tree analysis - to make inferences about the mapping from Blackwall factors to awards
implicit in the salvage cases from 1799 to 2007. The results suggested a ranking of the Blackwall factors, in which the three
most important factors, in descending order of importance,
were the value of the property saved (factor 5), the labor expended by the salvors (factor 1), and the danger to the property
saved (factor 6). The three least important factors were the skill
displayed by the salvors (factor 2), the danger to the salvors’
property (factor 3), and the risk incurred by the salvors (factor 4).
Although these factors were consistently from the bottom tier,
their order within the bottom tier varied across the results.
According to Article 8 of the Brussels Salvage Convention
1910, the remuneration is fixed by the court according to the circumstances of each case, on the basis of the following considerations:
(a) Firstly, the measure of success obtained, the efforts and deserts of the salvors, the danger run by the salved vessel, by
her passengers, crew and cargo, by the salvors, and by the
salving vessel; the time expended, the expenses incurred and
losses suffered, and the risks of liability and other risks run
by the salvors, and also the value of the property exposed to
such risks, due regard being had to the special appropriation
(if any) of the salvorsʼ vessel for salvage purposes
(b) Secondly, the value of the property salved.
The Brussels Salvage Convention largely restated the English
law and was not enacted in the United Kingdom. However, the
English law of salvage is now subject to the International Salvage Convention 1989.
Predate the 1989 Salvage Convention, Landes and Posner
(1978) used a model of contingent payment to show how price
was determined efficiently in a rescue market. They rejected the
notion, judge-made law in the area of salvage, was based on the
notion of fairness and justice. They also asserted that the rules
were best explained as efforts to bring about efficient results.
This is in some way reflected in the protection the law affords
to the parties in respect of agreements made in emergency conditions. They adopted the same criteria in Kennedy’s salvage
treatise (Rose, 2002). However, Rose and others characterise
salvage awards as a form of restitution for unjust enrichment,
whereas legal economists such as Richard Posner prefer an ana-

lysis that seeks to explain the evolution of salvage law as progress towards an allocatively efficient use of rescue and safety
resources. Moreover, Hallwood and Miceli (2004 & 2005)
argue that Landes and Posner’s approach, which is based on a
hypothetical bargain between the owner of a lost vessel and the
salvor, is inappropriate for historically valuable wrecks. Swan
(2009) describes these two models for explaining salvage and
examine how each can be applied to modern developments in
salvage law and in particular the more recent need to reward
salvors for their efforts in preventing environmental pollution.
Previous editions of Kennedy’s have recorded a classification
of “material circumstances” to be taken into account in assessing salvage rewards as follow:
A. As Regards the Salved Property:
(1) The degree of danger, if any, to human life.
(2) The degree of danger to the property.
(3) The value of the property as salved.
B. As Regards the Salvors:
(1) The degree of danger, if any, to human life.
(2) The salvors’ (a) classification, (b) skill and (c) conduct.
(3) The degree of danger , if any, to property employed in the
salvage services and its value.
(4) The (a) time occupied and (b) work done in the performance of the salvage service.
(5) Responsibilities incurred in the performance of the salvage
service, such, e.g., as risk to the insurance, and liability to
passengers of freighters through deviation or delay.
(6) Loss or expense incurred in the performance of the salvage
service, such, e.g., as detention, loss of profitable trade, repair of damage caused to ship, boats, or gear, fuel consumed,
etc.
It reflects the “no-cure no pay” nature of salvage contracts.
This economic analysis of salvage awards is reflected in the criteria used in arbitration to determine the amount of salvage.
Straightforward jobs with high probability of success generally
get smaller payments than high-risk operations. Thus, the criteria for determining awards reflect the outcome that is most
economically in terms of the allocation of resources to safety measures and rescue capability (Swan, 2009). However, Markovits
(2005 & 2010) points out that the preceding analysis refutes
Landes and Posner's claim that the law of marine salvage is
consistent with and displays impressive congruence with their
hypothesis that the rules of judge-made law are best explained
as efforts - however unwitting - to bring about (economically) efficient results. He also delineates the structural deficiencies of
the type of argument with which Landes and Posner attempt to establish their conclusion that marine-salvage law is allocatively
efficient.
In determining how much a judge or arbitrator should award
for pure salvage, several factors are considered under the 1989
Salvage Convention. So does the contract salvage. Both LOF and
similar contract form require the salvage award be assessed un-
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der the 1989 Salvage Convention’s criteria if a fixed cost for
the salvage project is not agreed upon. These criteria are:
(a) Salved value of the vessel and other property;
(b) Skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimizing
damage to the environment;
(c) Measure of success obtained by the salvor;
(d) Nature and degree of the danger;
(e) Skill and efforts of the salvor in saving the vessel, other
property and life;
(f) Time used and expenses incurred by the salvors;
(g) Risk or liability and other risks run by the salvors and their
equipment;
(h) Promptness of the services rendered;
(i) Availability and use of vessels or other equipment intended
for salvage operations; and,
(j) State of readiness and efficiency of the salvor’s equipment
and the value thereof.
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However, there is no quantitative research available on the
cost of salvage under different salvage form, nor any precise formula calculating the difference.
An easy way to understand the salvage award is to use a
simplified formula:
Salvage Succeeded under LOF
Salvage Award = Property salved*Effort done
= Salved values*Award to values (%)
Example 1:
A vessel is on fire and her cargo hold is exploding in the open
sea. Shipowner has no time to negotate a fair contract with salvor.
LOF is the only choice. Assume: Property salved is US$ 10 million, Award to values is 10%.
Salvage Award = US$ 10 million*10% = US$ 1 million
Salvage Succeeded but SCOPIC Invoked under LOF

The amount of salvage awards will vary depending on the facts
of each claim. The award, however, can not exceed the total value
of the property saved.
The criteria are general principles for a judge or arbitrator
to determine the award. Yet, salvage law does not provide the
recipe. It provides only a handful of general principles to guide
the courts and to delimit their discretion. It is necessary to look
at each of the criteria individually. Two matters must be at the forefront of any consideration. First, the concept of “encouraging
salvage operation” must be in the forefront of every case. The
fundamental principle of “encouragement” is of long-established
vintage in salvage law, pre-dating its express mention in Article
13 of the 1989 Salvage Convention which states that the reward
must be fixed with a view to encouraging salvage operations,
taking into account the specific listed criteria. Secondly, the order in which the criteria is irrelevant in the fixing of the reward
(Reeder, 2003). In other words, the salvors should be paid for
benefits conferred to the property and the public policy requires
such payment to be generous with a view to encouragement of
salvors.
The factors listed above are not listed in order of importance
and there is no specified formula for determining the award.
However, from a public policy standpoint, several of the factors
are particularly notable. The second factor encourages the court
to consider the salvor’s efforts to protect the environment in determination of award. Hess (2013) emphasized and used a simple formula1 to quantify the minimum salvage award a salvor
may expect and put a very heavy weight on the environment
factor.

1

Salvage Award = (Property salved*Effort done)  Discount
= (Salved values*Award to values (%))  25%
(Difference between Article 13 Award or
Settlement and SCOPIC Remuneration)
Example 2:
Scenario is the same as Example 1. Slavor has no confident
to salve the vessel. Therefore, he invokes SCOPIC. Assume:
Property salved is US$ 10 million, Award to values is 10%,
SCOPIC Remuneration is US$ 400,000.
Salvage Award = US$ 1 million  25% (US$ 1 million 
US$ 400,000) = US$ 1 million  US$ 150,000 = US$ 850,000
Salvage Failed and SCOPIC Invoked under LOF
Salvage Award = (Costs occurred*Effort done)  Standard
bonus = (SCOPIC Remuneration)  25% Uplift
Example 3:
Scenario is the same as Example 2
Salvage Award = US$ 400,000  25% (US$ 400,000)
= US$ 500,000
Salvage under TOWHIRE or WRECKHIRE
Salvage Award = (SCOPIC Appendix A*Days)  Uplift (%)

EV = probability of loss plus probability of profit = -100(.2)  25(.8) = -20  20 = 0, therefore award must be > 125.
EV = -70(.2)  25(.8) = 6, therefore at 125 the salvage is profitable. The break-even point under Article 14 would therefore be -70(.2)  17.5(.8) = -14  14 = 0 so
salvage award must be > 117.5.
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Table 3. Salvage under LOF.
LOF
Example 1
Example 2
Example 3
Salvage succeeded



SCOPIC



Salvage Award
US$ 1 million US$ 850,000 US$ 500,000

Table 4. Salvage under other contracts.
Non-LOF
SCOPIC rate
Fixed rate
Extra bouns/Time element
Salvage Award

Example 4



US$ 193,750

Example 5



US$ 165,000

Example 4:
A vessel’s main engine fails in the calm sea and a tow is necessary. TOWHIRE is engaged to apply SCOPIC rate, regardness of property values. A 25% extra bonus is offered if the
salvage is done within 10 days. A tug with 5,000 b.h.p. is hired.
It takes 10 days to finish the operation. SCOPIC rate is US$
15,500/per day as per SCOPIC 2017.
Salvage Award = (US$ 15,500*10)  155,000*25%
= US$ 193,750
Fixed Price under Other Contract
Salvage Award = (Fixed Rate*Days)  Uplift (%) or
Salvage Award = Lump sum price  Uplift (%)
Example 5:
Scenario is the same as Example 4. A tug with a fixed rate at
US$ 15,000/per day is hired, regardness of property values. However, it takes 11 days to finish the operation.
Salvage Award = (US$ 15,000*11)  Zero bouns (exceeded 10
days) = US$ 165,000
Based on the above, in any circumstances, LOF is the most
profitable salvage contract in comparision with any other forms.
Salvor will still receive salvage award no matter succeed or fail,
the result is just a matter of money – more or less (See Table 3
and Table 4).

VII. CONCLUSION
There are two types of salvage. “Pure salvage” occurs when
the salvor is a volunteer. “Contract salvage” occurs when the
salvor and the distressed vessel enter into an agreement concerning the salvage effort. The right to be rewarded for salvage at
sea under common law is based both on equitable principles and

public policy and is not contractual in origin.
No Shipowner would like to use LOF unless it becomes necessary. Shipowner prefers salvage contract which is calculated
on daily rate or lump sum basis, if he still has choices. However,
when a vessel is in an urgent and dangerous situation, LOF is
the most preferred salvage contract in comparision with other
national forms. In the contrary, LOF is the most profitable salvage contract from salvor’s standpoint. In the shipping practice,
salvor would offer LOF in the first beginning and bargain with
shipowner in different scenario. If LOF is engaged, high profit is
foreseeable. If not, with other contract form, low profit is also
guaranteed.
Every year, whilst engaged on LOF contracts, ISU salvors
recover property valued in excess of US$1 billion. A salvage
reward is based on the salved values and other criteria such as the
skill and efforts of the salvor. Based on the concept of “encouraging salvage operation”, salvage awards are intended to be generous in order to encourage salvage efforts and would never
be a cheap deal. LOF seems like an “open cheque” for the salvor and the decline in LOF cases is just a matter of time.
In addition, some countries, like China, U.S. and Egypt, Shipowner does not have much choice to select salvor freely under
some circumstances, especially when the national governments
are involved in pollution issue.
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